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Abstract
Since the adoption of teacher evaluation systems that rely, at least in part, on contro-
versial student achievement measures, little research has been conducted that focuses
on stakeholders’ perceptions of systems in practice, specifically school principals.
This study was conducted in a large urban school district to better understand prin-
cipals’ perceptions of evaluating teachers based on professional practice and student
achievement. Principals in this study strongly expressed concerns regarding: a) the
negative impact of the teacher evaluation system on morale; b) their lack of auton-
omy in evaluating teachers and making staffing decisions; and c) their perceived lack
of value as professionals. Examining the implications of teacher evaluation systems
is increasingly important to better understand the intended and unintended conse-
quences of these systems in practice.
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Introduction
In recent years, growing public demand for quantifiable measures of school and
teacher effectiveness has dominated the policy debates surrounding educational ac-
countability in the United States and other countries. In response to the widespread
criticism of traditional evaluation systems using teacher education and credentials
(Tucker & Stronge, 2005), many states have adopted teacher evaluation systems that
rely, at least in part, upon complex statistical measures of student achievement, such
as value-added models (VAMs), in addition to measures of teachers’ professional
practice (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008, 2014; Braun, 2005; Lavigne, 2014; Lavigne &
Good, 2014). Despite the recent passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA,
2016), which eliminates the federal mandate in the United States that teacher eval-
uations are linked to students’ test scores, some states are still moving forward with
stronger accountability reforms (Felton, 2016; Loewus, 2017; Will, 2016). 
Regardless of the intended and unintended consequences associated with re-
cruiting, hiring, promoting, developing, and retaining teachers based on such eval-
uation outcomes, what is grossly missing from the research literature about these
measures are the school administrator and teacher perceptions of them in use (Harris
& Herrington, 2015; Hopkins, 2016; Kraft & Gilmour, 2016). In other words, how
principals and teachers experience and perceive these systems and related high-
stakes consequences remains largely unexamined, and consequently ignored, at mul-
tiple policy levels.
This article discusses the findings and implications of a survey research study con-
ducted in a large urban school district to examine the perceptions of principals toward
their district’s teacher evaluation system. At the time of this study, the school district,
one of the largest in its state and among the largest urban districts in the United States,
evaluated teachers of core content areas (e.g., reading, writing, mathematics, and sci-
ence) based on their professional practice (25%), instructional practice (25%), and
value-added scores (50%) (e.g., the SAS® Education Value-Added Assessment System
[EVAAS®]). While VAM-based outcomes are still wrought with criticisms, mainly
about the validity, reliability, potential bias, and fairness of measure outputs, evaluation
results have been and are increasingly being used to make high-stakes employment
decisions in this district and across the nation (Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Baker,
Oluwole, & Green, 2013; Berliner, 2014; Corcoran, 2010; Herlihy, Karger, Pollard,
Hill, Kraft, Williams, & Howard, 2014; Lavigne, 2014; Lavigne & Good, 2014).
Framework
The Measure and Punish (M&P) Theory of Change provides the framework for un-
derstanding the policy context in this study. Although generally conceived of as a
colloquial expression, this M&P Theory of Change, as operationalized by Audrey
Amrein-Beardsley (2014) and applied here, suggests that “by holding districts,
schools, teachers, and students accountable for performance on the states’ large-scale
standardized achievement tests, administrators will supervise the schools better,
teachers will teach better, and students will learn more, particularly in the nation’s
lowest performing schools” (p. 72). Based on this logic, change in performance can








essence, students will learn more if they are better taught, but teachers will not teach
better unless they are subject to high-stakes consequences for poor outcomes (Smith,
2004). Accordingly, federal and state policy that holds educators accountable, in this
case through a high-stakes teacher evaluation system, will ensure that students meet
higher standards of learning, as measured by their performance on high-stakes tests
(Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Smith, 2004).
In short, this M&P Theory of Change suggests that students, especially those in
the highest-need schools and districts, will learn more as a result of a stronger ac-
countability policy. As such, perceptions of stakeholders as the primary recipients of,
and actors within, larger, complex evaluation systems driven by this theory of change,
specifically with regards to system implementation, must be better understood given
the myriad intended and unintended consequences associated with evaluation out-
comes. The findings in this study, based on the perceptions of principals in one large
urban school district regarding their district’s teacher evaluation system, give voice to
stakeholder concerns about the rationality of this M&P Theory of Change in practice. 
Literature review
Historical background
Despite ongoing efforts to improve the quality of schools and increase student learn-
ing in the United States by evaluating and developing the skills of teachers, the pub-
lication of A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983)
purported that low student achievement was placing the nation “at risk” of continued
economic decline. Among several recommendations outlined in the report, the
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) suggested that comprehen-
sive evaluations and increased salaries would foster higher expectations of profes-
sional competence among teachers. In Action for Excellence, the Task Force on
Education for Economic Growth from the Education Commission of the States (ECS,
1983) reiterated the importance of teacher competency cited by the national com-
mission and called for the development and implementation of “systems for fairly
and objectively measuring the effectiveness of teachers and rewarding outstanding
performance” (p. 39). The task force’s emphasis on evaluation with an ancillary focus
on the need to professionalize teaching reaffirmed the belief that “better teachers and
better teaching” (Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin, & Bernstein, 1985, p. 62)
are the primary factors in educational improvement.
As part of an ongoing effort to improve student learning outcomes, the goals for
standards-based educational reform, supported by former president George H.W.
Bush and subsequent administrations, were first outlined in Goals 2000 and later
incorporated into the updated Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),
under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act (2002). By mandating that all students
demonstrate proficiency on state-determined standards in reading and mathematics
by 2014, the NCLB Act spurred the development of large-scale standardized tests in
every state for the purposes of measuring student learning and, ultimately, school
and teacher quality (David & Cuban, 2010).
Following the passage of the NCLB Act, states were prompted to develop and








be eligible for Race to the Top (RttT) and Teacher Incentive Fund (TIP) grants from
the United States Department of Education (2009, 2010). Accordingly, states were
required to provide evidence of compliance with regards to their accountability sys-
tem, which had to rely, at least in part, on student performance on large-scale state-
level standardized tests (Amrein-Beardsley 2008, 2014; Braun, 2005; Corcoran,
2010; United States Department of Education, 2009). Subsequently, states across
the nation developed and implemented such systems based on quantitative measures
of teacher and school effectiveness, often associated with high-stakes consequences
(Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012; Baker, Oluwole, & Green, 2013; Berliner, 2014;
Corcoran, 2010; Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009).
Current policy context
As part of a new wave of accountability policy, ESSA (2016) recently eliminated the
federal mandate in the Unites States that teacher evaluation systems must be linked
to student test scores; however, more than one year after the act’s passage, most states
are still mired in debate, and in some states litigation, surrounding the use of meas-
ures of student achievement to evaluate teachers (Hazi, 2017; Loewus, 2017; see
also Will, 2016). ESSA provides states with greater flexibility in terms of how to eval-
uate teachers, and as a result, states are “all over the map” (Will, 2016, p. 31) with
regards to how they intend to proceed. As of late 2017, some states (e.g., Indiana,
Louisiana) are reexamining the use of student test scores in teacher evaluations, while
others (e.g., Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma) have
discontinued or moved away from this practice, at least to some extent (Loewus,
2017). For example, teachers in Kentucky may still receive student growth data, but
its inclusion in their evaluation is at the discretion of their districts (Loewus, 2017).
Teachers in other states are still required to provide evidence of student learning
(e.g., Connecticut, Nevada, Utah), but they cannot use students’ scores on state stan-
dardized tests as evidence. Legislatures in Arizona, Maine, and New Mexico approved
bills to discontinue or reduce the weight of student achievement, but the governor
of each state vetoed the respective legislation (Loewus, 2017). Perhaps most con-
cerning, litigation is or was recently underway (at various stages in the judicial
process) in six states (Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and
Texas) that challenges the use of student growth measures in teacher evaluations for
high-stakes decision-making (Hazi, 2017).
Local context
As mentioned previously, the school district in this study is one of the largest in its
state. It is among the largest urban districts in the United States, currently consisting
of almost 300 schools, enrolling more than 200,000 students, and employing more
than 10,000 teachers. The district serves a diverse student population in terms of
racial/ethnic background (more than 60% Hispanic, more than 20% African
American, and less than 15% White, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and two or more races). Many of the students in the dis-
trict are also considered high-needs based on their qualification for Title I funds








(more than 70%), limited English language proficiency (more than 30%), or eligi-
bility for special education services (more than 5%).
For more than five years, students in this state, depending upon their grade level,
have been assessed in core content areas using the state standardized tests. Annual
assessments include reading and mathematics (grades 3–8), writing (grades 4 and
7), science (grades 5 and 8), social studies (grade 8), and high school end-of-course
assessments (in English I and II, Algebra I, Biology, and United States History). At
the time of the study, value-added scores (i.e., generated via the SAS® EVAAS®) for
teachers in this district who taught core content areas (e.g., reading, writing, math-
ematics, science) comprised 50 percent of their evaluation score. 
While traditional measures of achievement are based on the growth observed
on an individual student’s or cohorts of students’ large-scaled standardized test scores
at one or two points in time, VAMs attempt to isolate the effects of individual teachers
on their students’ learning from one year to the next (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008, 2014;
Braun, 2005; Harris, 2011; Papay, 2010; Scherrer, 2011) by predicting the student’s
performance on a test based on prior achievement and (often) background charac-
teristics (e.g., racial or ethnic background, special education needs, English language
proficiency, socioeconomic status) (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008; 2014; Braun, 2005;
Harris, 2011; Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & Thomas, 2010; Papay, 2010;
Scherrer, 2011).
Although VAM-based outcomes remain controversial in terms of their validity,
reliability, potential bias, and fairness, this district has been widely recognized for
its historically high-stakes use of EVAAS® scores for making personnel decisions.
Teachers have been subject to penalties and sanctions (e.g., related to teacher merit
pay, retention) based on their evaluation scores. In fact, the district has made adverse
employment decisions for teachers based on their low VAM scores. As such, percep-
tions of stakeholders, principals in this case, must be better understood given the




In this survey research study, the researcher worked with a third party to design and
administer an online survey examining principals’ perceptions of their district’s
teacher evaluation system (see Appendix), specifically to better understand their per-
ceptions of evaluating teachers based on professional and instructional practices as
well as student achievement (i.e., value-added scores). The single-strand mixed-meth-
ods design used in this study included an online survey instrument with both closed-
and open-ended items, which was administered to all principals in the district.
Data collection
Survey instrument
In terms of instrument design, the survey included 12 closed-ended questions and
one open-ended question. The survey questions were broadly aligned to the following








and 9); b) principal autonomy (questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8); and c) principals’ plans
for future employment (questions 10, 11, and 12). The open-ended survey item in-
vited respondents to provide additional comments, if they were so inclined. It is im-
portant to note that the structure of some of the closed-ended survey items, and the
alignment of the overarching research question (i.e., principals’ perceptions of their
teacher evaluation system) to those items, reflects the interests of the third-party sur-
vey administrators. As such, it is important to acknowledge the role of the third party
and the researcher’s positionality in the context of this study (Creswell, 2014).
Researcher positionality
The researcher is/was not directly affiliated with either the district or the third party
in this study. Rather, the third party was a professional organization indirectly affili-
ated with the district (i.e., it had the direct knowledge of the teacher evaluation sys-
tem development and implementation necessary for survey design, and it had
permission to use available contact information to disseminate the survey to prospec-
tive participants). The researcher’s primary responsibility included analyzing the quan-
titative and qualitative survey data collected to triangulate findings and draw
conclusions, independently from both the third party and the district.
The researcher’s external role in data collection and analysis merits some specific
considerations. First, serving in an external role in data collection helped to mitigate
the potential dilemmas of conducting “backyard research” (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992,
pp. 22–23). Whereas direct affiliation with either the district (e.g., as an employee)
or the third party (e.g., through membership in the organization or receiving com-
pensation for conducting the analysis) might have introduced bias, the researcher’s
positionality lends credibility to data analysis in terms of triangulating the quantita-
tive and qualitative data (Creswell, 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). However, the re-
searcher also acknowledges potential limitations in data interpretation as a result of
the language used in some items (e.g., yes/no, Likert-type response options). With
this in mind, readers are encouraged to consider the voice of participants as reflected
in both closed- and open-ended responses and evaluate the study findings for their
potential contribution to the gap in existing literature.
Participants
In total, 273 principals were invited to participate in the survey, and of these, 70 re-
sponded (25.6%), including principals from high (n = 9/70, 12.9%), middle (n = 13/70,
18.6%), elementary (n = 40/70, 57.1%), and other (e.g., charter, combined; n = 8/70,
11.4%) schools. Relative to the total number of principals invited to participate, the
response rate for principals by type of school is as follows: high (n = 9/44, 20.5%),
middle (n = 13/40, 32.5%), elementary (n = 40/147, 27.2%), and other (n = 8/42,
19.0%). Middle schools had the highest principal response rate (32.5%), and other
(e.g., charter, combined) schools had the lowest response rate (19.0%).
Given this response rate (25.6%), it is conceivable that responses may reflect the
sentiments of principals who are most troubled by the evaluation system in their dis-
trict; thus, results might represent the extremes in the population, and they may not








instrument did not include demographic questions to help mitigate anticipated con-
cerns about anonymity. Accordingly, the researcher was not able to determine sample
representativeness based on demographic characteristics. It is important to note that
this study was conducted so that readers might make more naturalistic generaliza-
tions from the findings (Stake & Trumbull, 1982), versus statistically significant in-
ferences from the sample to the population. Accordingly, study results do merit
consideration given the high-stakes consequences attached to value-added output
in this district, in practice. It is this set of perceptions, as stated, that are still missing
from many of the conversations surrounding value-added uses and consequences. 
Data analysis
The researcher analyzed respondent survey data by calculating descriptive statistics
based on participants’ responses to the 12 closed-ended questions and by coding
qualitative data using three rounds of “constant comparison” to develop codes and
categories. The researcher then constructed a list of common themes based on the
instances appearing in the raw data (Erickson, 1986; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Smith,
1997). Specifically, the researcher read and pre-coded the entire corpus of qualitative
survey data to highlight significant participant quotes (Layder, 1998), before manu-
ally coding each participant response using a structural coding method. The re-
searcher selected structural coding for the first coding cycle as a means of “cod[ing]
and initially categor[izing] the data corpus to examine comparable segments, com-
monalities, differences, and relationships” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 84), especially given
the data set included multiple participants. 
In the second coding cycle, the researcher used focused coding to identify the
most frequent codes (e.g., morale, climate, pressure), develop categories (e.g., teacher
recruitment and retention, the role of external decision-makers) (Charmaz, 2006),
and generate themes (Erickson, 1986). These themes included: a) the impact of eval-
uation processes and outcomes on morale; b) the district-level pressures on princi-
pals with regards to teacher recruitment, hiring, promotion, and retention; and c)
the (lack of) value placed on principals as professionals. After composing assertions
and searching for confirming and disconfirming evidence in the data, the researcher
extracted respondent quotes to warrant the assertions (Erickson, 1986; Smith, 1997;
see also Saldaña, 2013).
Results
Impact on teacher and principal morale
Principals reportedly perceived the evaluation process and related outcomes as hav-
ing a generally negative impact on morale. At least one out of three survey respon-
dents (n = 24/70, 34.3%) indicated that they are not able to recruit and keep staff at
their school, and only 5.7 percent of respondents (n = 4/70) agreed that the district’s
culture, reportedly influenced by the use of teacher evaluation data per principals’
open-ended responses, contributed to high morale among their teaching staff.
Relatedly, 88.6 percent (n = 62/70) agreed that, rather, there is a culture of intimida-
tion in the district fostered by this particular evaluation system. See Table 1 for the








Table 1. Principal respondents’ perceptions on recruitment and retention, 
morale, and district culture
Note: Counts are presented as raw numbers with respective valid proportions of the total
participants in parentheses. Valid proportions may not total 100 due to rounding.
Concerns about low teacher morale were commonly expressed in open-ended
responses as well. One respondent explained that there is a “culture of ‘mean’ in this
district … [that] is competitive and has caused many teachers to think about ‘my’
students rather than ‘our’ students as a whole.” Another respondent described morale
as “the lowest in the history of our district,” adding that “the constant bashing of
teachers and administrators is reaching a boiling point.” A third principal noted that
“all that matters [in this district] are the test results. Everything is about numbers.”
Another noted that “teachers with high professional standards are not valued. There
is not a sense of teamwork.” Several principals cited the overwhelming emphasis on
students’ test scores rather than teaching and learning as an exceptionally negative
consequence of the current evaluation system.
As per the principals’ responses to open-ended questions, their own morale has
also deteriorated in the wake of system implementation. One principal explained
that “we are tired of being told how ‘bad’ and ‘ineffective’ we are as administrators
and teachers. You can only tell someone this so long before it becomes a reality. [It
is a] self-fulfilling prophecy!” Although a few principals cited their important role in
shaping school culture and morale and noted few problems in these areas, they also
acknowledged that “many principals are pressured and scared to come forward” or
“have not been so fortunate” at their own schools.
Another principal described the generally negative impact of the district culture
on staffing, noting that it “does not assist with recruitment and retention of teachers.”
Although denying any knowledge of a quota for file review and staff problems, another
principal cited the need “to reassure [school staff] because they feel intimidated and
almost paranoid by such gossip.” Others reported similar “horror stories from col-
leagues” and described little “sense of [job] security” as well as rapid evaluation system
changes with “inadequate communication” as detrimental to staff morale or retention. 
Principals’ (lack of) autonomy as evaluators
Many principals also described significant district-level pressures perceivably placed
on them to ensure or guarantee specific evaluation outcomes. In response to the sur-
vey, almost half of principals (n = 33/70, 47.1%) reported always or frequently feeling












Question 1: I am able to recruit and keep









Question 2: [Name of school district]’s
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specifically, 42.8 percent (n = 30/70) and 45.7 percent (n = 32/70) of principals, re-
spectively, reported always or frequently being told which teachers to place on a plan
or that they must bring more teachers forward for file review. Accordingly, four out
of ten principals (n = 28/70, 40.0%) reported that they are always or frequently pres-
sured to give lower scores on teacher observations and evaluations than they think
are deserved. Nearly four out of ten principals (n = 27/70, 38.6%) reported having
been told what proportion of teachers should be placed on a plan of improvement.
Accordingly, 40.0 percent (n = 28/70) indicated that they have been told they must
recommend a minimum proportion of teachers for termination or nonrenewal each
year. See Tables 2 and 3 for the proportions of responses for each survey question.
Principals frequently described perceived pressures in their open-ended re-
sponses as well. Regarding the need for alignment between teacher observation and
VAM scores, one principal explicitly clarified feeling pressure that “teachers’ [profes-
sional practice] ratings must reflect the EVAAS® scores,” even if that means giving
teachers a lower observation rating than they feel is deserved. Also describing pres-
sure to terminate teachers or not renew their contract, one principal explained that
“there is a general pressure that every principal feels to keep effective teachers and
move out ineffective teachers, [but] I don’t think there is any plan at the district level
to help challenging schools.” Another principal noted the impact of external deci-
sion-makers: “Personnel making big decisions on teacher [evaluation], [the] hiring








Statement Always Frequently Occasionally Never n
Question 3: I am pressured to make decisions
regarding teacher evaluation and retention by
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Statement Yes No n
Question 7: I have been told I must have a certain







Question 8: I have been told I must recommend the








Table 2. Principal respondents’ perceptions on district-level pressures in evaluating teachers
Table 3. Principal respondents’ perceptions on teacher plans of improvement 
and termination or nonrenewal
Note: Counts are presented as raw numbers with respective valid proportions of the total participants in
parentheses. Valid proportions may not total 100 due to rounding.
Note: Counts are presented as raw numbers with respective valid proportions of the total participants in parentheses.
Valid proportions may not total 100 due to rounding.
derstand school needs.” In their open-ended responses, several principals explicitly
expressed not only concerns about their own lack of autonomy as evaluators but
also their frustration at the perceived lack of district-level support in improving
teacher and student outcomes.
Lack of value for principals as professionals
Principal respondents’ dissatisfaction with their current employment, as evidenced
by their responses to closed-ended survey items about their future career plans, may
be due, at least in part, to their perceived lack of professional value to the district, as
reported in their open-ended responses. In terms of future career plans, four out of
ten principals (n = 29/70, 41.4%) reported that they do not plan to or are unsure
whether they will remain employed in the district for the next five years. In total,
77.1 percent (n = 54/70) would leave if they could find another position elsewhere,
and 61.4 percent (n = 43/70) are currently making job inquiries in other districts.
See Tables 4 and 5 for the proportions of responses for these survey questions.
Table 4. Principal respondents’ five-year plan for employment
Note: Counts are presented as raw numbers with respective valid proportions of the total
participants in parentheses. Valid proportions may not total 100 due to rounding.
Table 5. Principal respondents’ plans to leave the school district
Note: Counts are presented as raw numbers with respective valid proportions of the total
participants in parentheses. Valid proportions may not total 100 due to rounding.
In their open-ended responses, principals frequently described feeling under-
valued as professionals. For example, one principal explained that “we do not get
support of any kind but are expected to perform at high levels. We are constantly
threatened and told we are replaceable.” Another principal summarized these con-
cerns, namely writing that the district:
prompts a negative environment with all employees—administra-
tors and teachers [and] promotes an unsustainable model of change
that is only sustainable by employing a modernized version of the
1900s factory model of education. Administrators are cheap and
unimportant raw materials that are chewed up and spit out without
any care or concern for their personal well-being. [This district] has
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Question 10: I plan to stay in [name
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served impoverished communities. Talent leaves when it is not val-
ued, but more importantly we have lost all [our] sense of humanity
in the name of ambiguous measures of student gains [as per
EVAAS®] that no one truly understands.
This principal added that “talent leaves but millions are spent recruiting the next
batch of unsuspecting recruits to replace administrators who have left.” Based on
open-ended responses, the rapid pace of implementation and resulting instability of
the district’s evaluation system, as explicated in this section, as well as other concerns
may provide context for respondents’ dissatisfaction with their current employment. 
Conclusions and implications
Despite the adoption of teacher evaluation systems that rely, at least in part, on com-
plex and controversial student achievement measures (e.g., VAMs), relatively little
attention has been given to stakeholders’ perceptions of these systems in practice,
especially principals’ perceptions. Principals in this study strongly expressed con-
cerns regarding: a) the negative impact of the teacher evaluation system on teacher
and principal morale; b) their lack of autonomy in evaluating teachers and making
staffing decisions; and c) their sense of their own limited professional value in the
district. While principals certainly eluded to or, in some instances, explicitly stated
that broader issues of control and accountability (and the resulting blame for per-
ceived failure) are at issue in this district, study findings suggest that issues surround-
ing perceived declining teacher and principal morale, diminishing principal
autonomy, and decreasing professional value are exacerbated by the evaluation sys-
tem, due to its design and/or implementation.
As noted prior, results likely do not generalize from this particular sample to the
population of principals throughout this district because those who responded might
have been the most distraught. These findings, however, are still key to understand-
ing principals’ specific (not general) perceptions as subjects of, and actors within,
this particular teacher evaluation system. Regardless, principal respondents’ overall
dissatisfaction with the district, reportedly augmented by the adverse effects of the
teacher evaluation system’s implementation, is still troubling.
Given the passage of ESSA and the newfound flexibility afforded to states that
are no longer required to use student achievement data to evaluate teachers in high-
stakes ways, state and local policymakers and district leaders should carefully listen
to the voices of stakeholders who are charged with implementing policy-driven sys-
tems that directly and profoundly affect teachers and students in practice. Whether
through new legislation or in response to litigation, state and local policymakers
who are now considering or reconsidering whether or to what extent to use student
growth data, such as that derived from VAMs, to evaluate teachers should also
thoughtfully consider school leaders’ concerns regarding the intended and unin-
tended consequences of evaluating teachers in high-stakes ways (e.g., the impact of
recruiting, hiring, promoting, developing, and retaining teachers based on contro-
versial measures of effectiveness). District leaders, regardless of whether their district
currently evaluates teachers using EVAAS® or another measure of student growth,








giving particular consideration to principals, with regards to implementing evalua-
tion systems in context. They might deliberately design or redesign evaluation sys-
tems that are found wanting. Ultimately, and most importantly, perceived declining
morale, diminishing autonomy, and lack of professional value on the part of princi-
pals adversely impacts the students in the classroom.
Accordingly, additional research is needed if state and local policymakers, district
leaders, and the general public are to better understand the implications of imple-
menting new accountability systems in schools. The lived realities of practitioners
matter, particularly given the high-stakes consequences that are often associated with
poor evaluation outcomes, which in current policy contexts are arguably driven in
large part by the M&P Theory of Change. Unfortunately, the consequences described
by principal participants here have already dramatically impacted them as local ad-
ministrators, and they have also impacted teachers and students. As such, it becomes
even more imperative that the voices of the principals in this study inform impending
policy changes in ways that help teachers and benefit students. 
References
Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2008). Methodological concerns about the Education Value-Added
Assessment System. Educational Researcher, 37(2), 65–75. doi: 10.3102/0013189X083
16420
Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2014). Rethinking value-added models in education: Critical perspectives
on tests and assessment-based accountability. New York, NY: Routledge.
Amrein-Beardsley, A., & Collins, C. (2012). The SAS Education Value-Added Assessment
System (SAS® EVAAS®) in the Houston Independent School District (HISD): Intended
and unintended consequences. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 20. Retrieved from
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/1096 [July 24, 2017].
Baker, B.D., Oluwole, J.O., & Green, P.C. (2013). The legal consequences of mandating high
stakes decisions based on low quality information: Teacher evaluation in the Race-to-
the-Top era. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(5). Retrieved from http://epaa.asu.edu
/ojs/article/view/1298 [January 24, 2015].
Berliner, D.C. (2014). Exogenous variables and value-added assessments: A fatal flaw. Teachers
College Record, 116, 1–31. Retrieved from http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?Content
Id=17293 [January 24, 2015].
Braun, H.I. (2005). Using student progress to evaluate teachers: A primer on value-added models.
Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. Retrieved from http://www.ets.org/Media
/Research/pdf/PICVAM.pdf [January 24, 2015].
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Corcoran, S.P. (2010). Can teachers be evaluated by their students’ test scores? Should they be? The
use of value-added measures of teacher effectiveness in policy and practice. Providence, RI:
Annenberg Institute for School Reform. Retrieved from http://www.annenberginstitute
.org/publications/can-teachers-be-evaluated-their-students%E2%80%99-test-scores
-should-they-be-use-value-added-me [July 24, 2017].
Creswell, J.W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches
(4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
David, J.L., & Cuban, L. (2010). Cutting through the hype: The essential guide to school reform
(Rev. ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. 
Education Commission of the States. (1983). Action for excellence. A comprehensive plan
to improve our nation’s schools. Report of the Task Force on Education for Economic Growth.
Denver, CO: Author.
Erickson, F. (1986). Qualitative methods in research on teaching. In M.C. Wittrock (Ed.),








Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) of 2015, Public Law 114–195, § 129 Stat. 1802. (2016). 
Felton, E. (2016, March 11). Southern lawmakers reconsidering role of test scores in teacher
evaluations [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacher
beat/2016/03/reconsidering_test_scores_in_teacher_evaluations.html?cmp=eml-enl
-eu-news3 [April 16, 2016].
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative re-
search. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Glesne, C., & Peshkin, A. (1992). Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction. White
Plains, NY: Longman.
Harris, D.N. (2011). Value-added measures in education: What every educator needs to know.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.
Harris, D.N., & Herrington, C.D. (2015). Editors’ introduction: The use of teacher value-
added measures in schools: New evidence, unanswered questions, and future prospects.
Educational Researcher, 44(2), 71–76. doi: 10.3102/0013189X15576142
Hazi, H.M. (2017). VAM under scrutiny: Teacher evaluation litigation in the states. The
Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 90(5-6), 184–190. doi:
10.1080/00098655.2017.1366803
Herlihy, C., Karger, E., Pollard, C., Hill, H. C., Kraft, M.A., Williams, M., & Howard, S.
(2014). State and local efforts to investigate the validity and reliability of scores from
teacher evaluation systems. Teachers College Record, 116, 1–28.
Hopkins, P. (2016). Teacher voice: How teachers perceive evaluations and how leaders can
use this knowledge to help teachers grow professionally. NASSP Bulletin, 100(1), 5–25.
doi: 10.1177/0192636516670771
Kraft, M.A., & Gilmour, A.F. (2016). Can principals promote teacher development as evalu-
ators? A case study of principals’ views and experiences. Educational Administration
Quarterly, 52(5), 711–753. doi: 10.1177/0013161X16653445
Lavigne, A.L. (2014). Exploring the intended and unintended consequences of high-stakes
teacher evaluation on schools, teachers, and students. Teachers College Record, 116, 1–29.
Retrieved from http://www.tcrecord.org/library/abstract.asp?contentid=17294 [January
24, 2015].
Lavigne, A.L., & Good, T.L. (2014). Teacher and student evaluation: Moving beyond the failure
of school reform. New York, NY: Routledge.
Layder, D. (1998). Sociological practice: Linking theory and research. London, UK: Sage.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. London, UK: Sage.
Loewus, L. (2017). Are states changing course on teacher evaluation? Test-score growth plays
lesser role in six states. Education Week, 37(13), 1–17. Retrieved from https://www.edweek
.org/ew/articles/2017/11/15/are-states-changing-course-on-teacher-evaluation.html
[February 18, 2018].
National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). A nation at risk: The imperative for
educational reform. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. 
Newton, X.A., Darling-Hammond, L., Haertel, E., & Thomas, E. (2010). Value-added modeling
of teacher effectiveness: An exploration of stability across models and contexts. Educational
Policy Analysis Archives, 18(23). Retrieved from https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/810
[January 24, 2015].
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. Public Law 107–110, § 115 Stat. 1425. (2002).
Papay, J.P. (2010). Different tests, different answers: The stability of teacher value-added esti-
mates across outcome measures. American Educational Research Journal, 48(1), 163–193.
doi: 10.3102/00002831210362589
Saldaña, J. (2013). The coding manual for qualitative researchers (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage.
Scherrer, J. (2011). Measuring teaching using value-added modeling: The imperfect panacea.
NASSP Bulletin, 95(2), 122–140. doi: 10.1177/0192636511410052
Smith, M.L. (1997). Mixing and matching: Methods and models. New Directions for Evaluation,
74, 73–85. doi: 10.1002/ev.1073
Smith, M.L. (2004). Political spectacle and the fate of American schools. New York, NY: Routledge.
Stake, R.E., & Trumbull, D. (1982). Naturalistic generalizations. Review Journal of Philosophy








Tucker, P.D., & Stronge, J.H. (2005). Linking teacher evaluation and student learning. Alexandria,
VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD).
United States Department of Education. (2009). Race to the top program: Executive summary. Retrieved
from http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf [July 6, 2013].
United States Department of Education. (2010). Teacher incentive fund. Retrieved from
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/index.html [July 6, 2013].
Weisberg, D., Sexton, S., Mulhern, J., & Keeling, D. (2009). The Widget Effect: Our national
failure to acknowledge and act of differences in teacher effectiveness (2nd ed.). Brooklyn, NY:
The New Teacher Project (TNTP). Retrieved from http://tntp.org/ideas-and-innovations
/view/the-widget-effect [January 23, 2018].
Will, M. (2016). Assessing quality of teaching staff still complex despite ESSA’s leeway. Education
Week, 36(16), 31–32. Retrieved from http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/04
/assessing-quality-of-teaching-staff-still-complex.html?intc=EW-QC17-TOC
&_ga=1.138540723.1051944855.1481128421 [April 9, 2017].
Wise, A.E., Darling-Hammond, L., McLaughlin, M.W., & Bernstein, H.T. (1985). Teacher
evaluation: A study of effective practices [special issue]. The Elementary School Journal,










I am able to recruit and keep staff at my school. (Yes/No)1.
[Name of school district removed]’s culture contributes to high2.
morale among my teaching staff. (Yes/No/Not Applicable)
I am pressured to make decisions regarding teacher evaluation and re-3.
tention by my superiors that I disagree with. (Always, Frequently,
Occasionally, Never)
I am told which teachers to place on a plan of improvement. (Always,4.
Frequently, Occasionally, Never)
I am told that I am bringing too few teachers forward for file review.5.
(Always, Frequently, Occasionally, Never)
I am pressured to give lower scores on observations and evaluations6.
than I think are deserved. (Always, Frequently, Occasionally, Never)
I have been told I must have a certain percentage of teachers on plans7.
of improvement. (Yes/No)
I have been told I must recommend the termination or nonrenewal of8.
a certain percentage of teachers each year. (Yes/No)
I feel there is a culture of intimidation in [name of school district re-9.
moved]. (Yes/No)
I plan to stay in [name of school district removed] for five or more10.
years. (Yes/No/Not Sure)
I would leave [name of school district removed] if I could get another11.
position. (Yes/No/Not Applicable)
I am currently making job inquiries outside of [name of school district12.
removed]. (Yes/No)
If there is anything else you would like to add, please do so here:13.
(Open Ended)
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